Ayodhya Verdict 2010: Whither Indian Constitution!

1 November, 2010
By Ram Puniyani

The verdict given by Lucknow bench of Allahabad high court (Sept 2010) has been a landmark of sorts. On one hand it is culmination of the process of demolition of Babri Masjid, now that illegal act of demolition has got a legal sanction. On the other this judgment is the one based on every other consideration than the legal one. It has no rooting in the values of Indian Constitution, no guidance from the directive principles of the Constitution and no grounding in the law of the land.
Despite this glaring fact a large section of the popular opinion went on to keep quiet about it, or criticize it in a muted way. The atmosphere has been created that it is a balanced judgment pleasing all; it has been the best option in the present circumstances etc. We do need to recall that there was heaviness in the atmosphere before the judgment. The Hindus were apprehensive that if by chance there is violence and they or their near and dear ones are caught in the melee, it will be a disaster. Muslim minority on the other hand feared the destruction of their properties or loss of their lives in case the violence breaks out. Fortunately those who orchestrate the violence, as shown by the inquiry committee reports time and over again, chose not to unleash ‘celebratory violence’, as they had done in the aftermath of Babri demolition on 6th December 1992. This time while probably the RSS combine and communalized sections of society felt more jubilant then before, still they had restrained themselves from creating a situation where the violence takes place.

Muslims on surface felt a bit relieved that they do not have to suffer another cycle of violence and its aftermath. But they also felt let down by the court. They did feel that this judgment is a symptom of Hindu Rashtra in the offing. While there is a spectrum of opinion amongst Muslim community, now there is a feeling that even the law cannot protect their just rights. Deep frustration, anger and dejection are the response from large section of the Muslims who dared to speak. The atmosphere created by communal propaganda has pushed them to the wall and ‘we should move on’ is the thinking of a section of Muslim community. The unevenness, the contrasting situations of ‘two sides’ of the dispute is very obvious, one side which is dominant got more than it could dream of and the other side feels betrayed once again..

While RSS combine is joyous that a path has been paved for the national sentiment of Bhavya (grand) Ram Temple, and has asked Muslims to contribute in the ‘national’ agenda. One knows that we are dealing with the contrasting notions of nationalism. The Nationalism RSS is talking is the anti thesis of secular democratic nation, the aspiration of freedom movement, the nation enshrined in the Indian Constitution. What else can one expect from this political outfit, RSS, which aims to transform our democratic polity into a Hindu nation, with all past political-social ideologies presented in newer language? RSS combine is already feeling that their agenda has gone one step up, as the illegal act of installation in 1949 and the criminal act of Babri demolition has been legitimized and has also ‘quietly’ become part of social common sense.

The reaction of Congress has been very pathetic. One knows that so far in the communal violence which has stalked the streets it has kept quiet, and many a times a section of its Chief Ministers and other top leaders have presided over the carnage. When communalists have been on their ’job’ of massacring and maiming the innocent populace, the Congress has been looking the other way around. Congress reaction has been no different in the aftermath of this judgment. Congress is happy that ‘peace’ is prevailing; it is immaterial for them that this is not the peace of harmony but the peace based on injustice. In their electoral calculations to speak as per the Constitutional values and adherence to law has been dispensed with long ago. Sticking to principles does not suit Congress opportunistic communalism. There are still some voices of protest and introspection which are deeply disturbed by this judgment. This section does feel that the judgment is a big jolt to the values of pluralism, democratic law and all that the idea for which India stands.

The bureaucracy and the other arms of state apparatus are satisfied as what matters for them is the apparent calm. The preservation of the law of the land is not their deeper concern. As such a large part of this machine called Indian state has been heavily coated with the paint of divisive ideology and it has imbibed the propaganda of the Hindutva, masquerading itself as the representative of all Hindus. In the steel frame of Indian state a section swears by Hindu nation openly and still larger section is the quiet accomplice in the process of erosion of democratic norms due to multiple factors. These factors are the ceaseless communal propaganda, adverse effects of globalization and the accompanying cultural changes. So the question is, in this situation who is the guardian of Indian Constitution? If the political leadership is happy with the apparent clam and unconcerned about justice, the future of values of Indian Constitution and principles of justice seem to be threatened as never before.

The judgment and the reaction to it is a matter of serious and severe concern for all those who want to adhere to Indian Constitution and abhor the concept of Hindu nation. It is the communal common sense which is dominating the day. The legitimacy being conferred on bypassing of legal foundations of India is a matter of much more serious concern then the previous assaults on the Indian Republic, the murder of the Father of the Nation Mahatma Gandhi, the anti Sikh pogrom, the Babri demolition, the burning of Pastor Graham Stains, the Gujarat pogrom, and the Kandhamal violence. One sees barring in the anti Sikh program, the common link in all these attacks on the idea of secular democratic India, is the ideology of Hindu nation, the political agenda of RSS. In this phenomenon, assault on Indian Constitution by RSS combine, the Congress plays an opportunist role of an accomplice, letting the things take place. In that sense it plays a supporting role in the violation of all whatever the founding fathers of Indian nation stood for. One is reminded of an analogy from the world of cricket. In this analogy Indian Constitutional values are batsmen, RSS-Hindutva politics is the bowler, Congress the fielder, communalized social common sense is the Umpire raising his finger at every appeal by the bowler and the section of state apparatus is the one deliberately overlooking the mischief of those preparing the pitch suitable for this bowler.

It is also reminiscent of the Nazi Germany where the demonization of Jews, Communist, Trade unionists, the erosion of popular culture and its impact on all the wings of state got seeped by the fascist values, values of suppression of minorities and other weaker sections of society. One knows the painful fact that every episode of violence takes the communal politics one notch up. The disturbing point is not just that the judgment has by passed the law of the land, but also that this has got such a welcome reception from all those powers which matter.

The progressive forces and secular movement has a lot of thinking to do. If secularism is being attacked by RSS combine, if secularism is not being honestly protected by the party in power, Indian National Congress, then what is to be done to protect it? How will idea of India, Indian Constitution be saved and by whom? The progressive liberal and democratic forces have to wake up that. It is a ‘do or die’ situation for Indian democracy. The prevalent social common sense, the erosion of democratic norms, the bypassing of Indian law by the Courts, is a matter of serious concern.

Ram Puniyani’s statement that the verdict given by Lucknow bench of Allahabad High Court is culmination of the process of demolition of Babri Masjid is clearly a contempt of Court. Also, when he says the judgment is based on every other consideration than the legal one, he is only saying that upholding the legitimacy of the Babri Masjid alone is legal and all other judgements are illegal. This can only be the opinion of a writer soaked in hatred of the Hindu position. Moreover, when the writer says that the judgement has no rooting in the values of Indian Constitution, no guidance from the directive principles of the Constitution and no grounding in the law of the land, he seems to be denying the right of a Court to evolve judgements to include evolving realities. A case as the Ram Mandir issue has probably never come up before in Indian jurisprudence. The Court did not have to bind itself to old solutions for new problems.
Last but not least when Ram Puniyani says there is a spectrum of opinion amongst Muslim community that now there is a feeling that even the law cannot protect their just rights, he is forgetting that Indian law has been tweaked unnaturally over the years to protect even unjust rights of the Muslims. What can they possibly complain as far as Indian law goes, except that it is not Shariat?

http://www.ndchronicle.com/news/Ayodhya_Verdict_2010__Whither_Indian_Constitution_1288595327/

Forum discussion on Ayodhya

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=5697&start=160

Ayodhya Verdict: Commentaries III

How Should the Muslims React?
Javed Anand articulates the Muslim despair in the Indian Express:
It is a maxim of mature democracies that where there is no justice, there is no peace. Is there justice in India? It’s up to you, dear reader, to ask yourself that question. Have the victims of communal mass killings — Nellie, Assam (1983), Delhi (1984), Malliana, Meerut (1987), Bhagalpur (1989), Mumbai (1992-93), Gujarat (2002), Kandhamal, Orissa (2008) — got justice? Have the masterminds, the main perpetrators of mass crimes or the policemen guilty of partisan conduct been punished? What prospects of a verdict on the crime committed in Ayodhya on December 6, 1992, during the life-time of many of the main accused?

In the last week or so the media has discovered a magic word: reconciliation. Nelson Mandela has shown the world that in certain circumstances there could be an alternate route to peace — Truth and Reconciliation. But in the land of the Mahatma there is no Mandela in sight and the demand of the hour is reconciliation minus justice, minus truth.

The Constitution of India does guarantee the security of life and property to all citizens. But the institutions of secular India do not take that constitutional obligation too seriously. “Apni jaan kis ko pyari nahin hoti? (Who does not value his life?),” says my friend Asif Khan. So it seems that India’s Muslims are reconciled to a “reconciliation” out of fear for their life and limb. Triumph of majoritarianism?
...In the best interests of the country and the community itself, Muslims must gift away even the one-third of the plot that for the moment is legally theirs. The disputed plot in Ayodhya, which millions of Hindus have come to believe as the birthplace of Ram Lalla, is absolutely the last place where the battle for the Idea of India — secular or majoritarian — must be fought.
The legal opinion:
Rajiv Dhavan in Mail Today:
The Muslims correctly argued that the entire theory of destruction of a Hindu temple by Babur is traceable to the Imperial Gazetteers which are not based on any historical source but on local belief. It is tolerably arguable that the three judges, faced with the gigantic task of presiding over this mass of materials and documents, lost the wood for the trees. By contrast when the Privy Council dealt with the loss of the Shahid Ganj Mosque to Maharana Ranjit Singh, and this was accepted in a judgment of 1855, it wrote a six page unanimous judgment saying that it was too late to open any controversy. The site now belonged to the Sikhs and the 19th Century judgment was binding (in lawyer’s language res judicata). The easiest thing in the world for the three judges would have been to follow a similar course for the Babri Masjid site, grant legal title to the Muslims, accept the 1881 judgment as res judicata and declare that the Muslims had not lost the site between 1949 and 1961 by which the time limitation had past; and the Hindus could not claim adverse possession. Curiously none of the judges accepted this simple argument which would have disposed off the case.
It cannot be overlooked that this was a title suit. Most of the other issues were not legal issues in a strict sense. Justices Khan and Agarwal treated the case as a partition suit dividing the property which nobody had asked for...
...Maybe on appeal, the Supreme Court will be able to clear up this mess and secure ‘peace and honour’ on a more just and secular basis. With this controversy over, Parliament’s law of 1991 that all other sites will observe the status quo which prevailed on August 15, 1947 should be respected. Bad theology, doubtful law and false ideology do not portend well for the future.
The same case law had earlier been cited, before the verdict, by Justice (retd) Rajinder Sachar:
3. The Privy Council while observing “their Lordship have every sympathy with a religious sentiment which would ascribe sanctity and in violability to a place of worship, they cannot under the Limitation Act accept the contentions that such a building cannot be possessed adversely”, went on to hold: “The Property now in question having been possessed by Sikhs adversely to the waqf and to all interests thereunder for more than 12 years, the right of the mutawali to possession for the purposes of the waqf came to an end under Limitation Act.“ On the same parity of reasoning even if temple existed prior to the building of Masjid 400 years ago, suit by VHP etc has to fail”.
In response to our queries on Justice Sachar and Rajeev Dhavan's criticism, only the following short note received so far from law professor Dr P. Chakravarti offers a possibility that the HC judgment could be upheld by the SC:
1. Waqf Board could only file a Title Suit (Islam is a modern religion, unlike Hinduism, or in this case, more appropriately the Ram-bhaktas who claim that Ram was born there much, much before the advent of Islam). Their claim dates back to a specific date when the mosque was built
2. If it can be proved that the mosque was built as a result of "conquest through invasion", as per current international law, it will not be a valid ground to hold the title to property. On the other hand, the 1949 incident, shameful though it may be, is "trespass" on what can arguably be described as property held illegally
3. As against 2 above, the Hindu claim is based on faith and therefore an entirely different legal reasoning has to be employed for determining the case when it comes to it, as it involves not individuals but the faith-system of an entire community according to which this is the land on which Ram was born.
4. It is established in Indian law, as Rajeev Dhavan's article also affirms, in addition to other links you have blogged, that deities can be juristic persons. And it is being argued that Ram was born (they don't have to specify when) much before the mosque was built. Even the land itself could be treated as a deity.
5. Even the Waqf is not in clear adverse possession of the disputed land for 20 years or more, unlike the Privy Council case, without any opposition (the Hindus have been opposing the Mosque, and praying at the same disputed site, for which there is record even in Imperial Gazetteers, as the Dhavan article above testifies. That is enough.).
6. ASI report can be relied upon by the court -- it does not have to independently check its veracity, and the burden of proof that it was cooked up would be for other litigants, and the issue is addressed in the judgments -- as proof that a temple existed before the mosque was built.
7. A detailed perusal, for which unfortunately I don't have time right now, would show what reasoning was adopted in the three judgments.
8. The 1991 law that all other sites will observe the status quo of August 15, 1947 -- which only had one exception, Ayodhya -- would ensure that the above is not treated as a precedent, which is why it was a law with foresight which, if applicable to Ayodhya, would have saved us all the bother of all this bloodbath.
The question posed in my first post -- and more specifically on Twitter -- though remains: Even if we take it that the above reasoning (or a variant thereof) holds in the SC, what if the mosque had not been demolished? Would the court have ordered demolition? A part demolition?
Interestingly, arguing from the other side, S. Gurumurthy, in his concluding article on the judgments in the New Indian Express, actually offers reasons why they are unsound in law:
So the settled legal position is this: even if parties, like the Ayodhya parties, who have filed suit asserting exclusive rights against one another, ask for partition, the court cannot grant it; and in no event the court can do it without the parties asking for it. None of these judicial rulings seem to have been noticed by the two judges. Had one of the parties asked for partition, the other party would have brought the case laws to the court’s notice. That is why law requires that the court should decide no issue that is not put to the parties. An order contrary to this principle is, in law, without jurisdiction. Civil law pundits would cite the old maxim of Coram Non Judici to say that the courts — read Justice Khan and Justice Agarwal — have no jurisdiction to do what they have done.
Now that they have passed the judgment, the judges will have to write a decree in accordance with the judgment. Assume that the judges can write a decree in the Hindus’ suit giving them less than their claim of 1/3 share. The suits of Muslims and Akhara having been dismissed, how could a decree be written in their favour? If no decree could be passed in their favour in their suits, they cannot get the 1/3 share at all. And no decree could be passed in the suits of the Hindus in favour of Muslims and Akhara! Therefore, the 1/3 gift by the two judges to them each will be only on paper. So a new battle will start only at the point if the two judges attempt to write the decree for two-thirds of the disputed land in favour of the Muslims and the Akhara whose suits stand dismissed.
In the same newspaper, the other luminary close to the Sangh parivar, the redoubtable Subramanian Swamy weighs in:
The fundamental question before us is: Can a temple and a masjid be considered on par as far as sacredness is concerned? Relying on two important court judgments that hold the field today, the answer is ‘no’. A masjid is not an essential part of Islam, according to a majority judgment of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court.
In the famous Ismail Farooqui vs Union of India case (reported in (1994) 6 SCC 376), the Supreme Court had observed: ‘It has been contended that a mosque enjoys a particular position in Muslim law and once a mosque is established and prayers are offered in such a mosque, the same remains for all time to come a property of Allah…and any person professing Islamic faith can offer prayer in such a mosque, and even if the structure is demolished, the place remains the same where namaz can be offered’. (para 80).
The Constitution Bench rebutted this contention. The Bench stated: ‘The correct position may be summarised thus. Under Mohammed law applicable in India, title to a mosque can be lost by adverse possession…A mosque is not an essential part of the practice of the religion of Islam and namaz (prayer) can be offered anywhere, even in the open. Accordingly, its acquisition is not prohibited by the provisions in the Constitution of India’. (para 82).
Thus what was wrong in the demolition of the Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992 was that it was unauthorised by law and hence a criminal offence. Otherwise any government depriving the Muslims of the Babri Masjid is within law, if the government decides to do so in the interest of public order, public health and morality (Article 25 of the Constitution). This is the position in Islamic law as well since in Saudi Arabia the authorities demolish mosque to lay roads. Even the mosque where Islam’s Prophet Mohammed used to pray was demolished for a road to pass through!
And he, ominously, concludes on this note:
Even if a temple is in ruins as the ASI had found, or destroyed as Ram temple was, any Hindu can sue on behalf of Lord Rama in court for recovery! No such ruling exists for a mosque. That is, the Ram temple on Ramjanmabhoomi has a superior claim to the site than any mosque. This the fundamental truth in the Ayodhya dispute. This truth will apply to Kashi Vishvanath and Brindavan temple sites as well.
Constitutional expert and senior Supreme Court advocate P.P. Rao, on the other hand, is clear and unambiguous:
Not one of the judgments can stand strict legal scrutiny. They have raised more questions than they have answered. Whose property did they divide and amongst whom and who wanted such a division? How could they award one-third share each after dismissing the suits of Nirmohi Akhara and Sunni Waqf Board? Who dedicated the land to Ram Lalla and when? In legal terms, the judgments are incorrect, but innovative. They are liable to be reversed on appeal. The affected parties have decided to move the Supreme Court, keeping the door open for settlement. We should thank God that they did not take to the streets to settle scores. Reposing faith in the judiciary is the wisest thing to do in a country governed by the rule of law. The parties apart, members of the two communities at large deserve praise for their restrained response to the verdict.
The role of the Congress since 1949
Rasheed Kidwai, in the Telegraph, provides an overview:
Decades later, in 1986, when Rajiv Gandhi was Prime Minister and the Congress was in power in Uttar Pradesh, the fast-paced events leading to the opening of the lock surprised even the BJP, which highlighted the Congress’s role in a White Paper published after the Babri Masjid was demolished.
Under the heading “The case for opening the lock — a contrast”, it asked sarcastically: “How is it this case moved at such a speed? How did the government acquiesce in this case? How did the Faizabad court allow the appeal (to open the lock) in two days when the Hindus had been pleading for 37 years? How did the Doordarshan cameras click the opening of the lock within an hour of the court order? All these questions have one answer, the government is not against such things and they can, and do, happen.”
Through 1986-1989, Rajiv Gandhi, his home minister Buta Singh, the then Uttar Pradesh chief ministers Veer Bahadur Singh and N.D. Tiwari kept trying to occupy the Ayodhya centre stage, coming up with plans. In 1989, the government even allowed the shilanyas (foundation ceremony) at the site. Somehow, each of these measures boomeranged.

Gurumurthy's article

Verdict -- a prologue

By S. Gurumurthy
expressbuzz.com
First Published: 02 Oct 2010 11:52:00 PM IST
Last Updated: 02 Oct 2010 01:07:54 AM IST


"My judgment is short, very short", writes a relieved and happy
Justice S U Khan who delivered the Ayodhya judgment along with
Justice S Agarwal and Justice D V Sharma. But that "short, very
short" judgment itself runs to 285 pages. The order of Justice S
Agarwal, with annexes, runs to over, believe it, 5,200 pages; that of
Justice D V Sharma tops over 1,700 pages including annexes. It means
this: to get a basic idea of the Ayodhya judgment one has to wade
through some 8,000 pages. This may well enter the Guinness book as
the longest judgment ever written! But what the visual media and
participants in debates had in their hands when they enlightened the
nation for almost four hours on the judgment was a one-page summary
of Justice Khan's order; a two-page summary of Justice Sharma's, and
a 12-page summary of Justice Agarwal's. Yet, in a couple of hours
they settled the national opinion on the long judgment of 8,000
pages!


The "quality" of their discourse was self-evident, even self-serving.
The visual media continuously ran headlines like "no temple was
demolished to build mosque", when the majority finding on the issue,
by Justices Agarwal (p5083) and Sharma (p28-104 in Waqf Board Suit)
was that the mosque "had been constructed on the site of Hindu temple
after demolishing the same"; the judges had found that the Hindus had
for long worshipped the place where the mosque stood as Ram Janma
Bhoomi (Sharma p172 Hindu Suit and Agarwal p5085). Most media
projected Justice Sharma's views as minority view. Actually it is
Justice Khan's that turns out to be that way, except on the division
of the disputed area where Justice Agarwal partly agrees with him.
But on the issue of the broken temple predating the mosque and on the
belief of the Hindus about the birthplace of Ram, Justice Agarwal and
Justice Sharma constitute a majority. Even Justice Khan does not deny
the existence of the broken temple but says the mosque was built on
temple ruins.


Again, the media did not highlight that the two judges have dismissed
the suits of the Sunni Waqf Board and the Nirmohi Akhara (believed to
be the proxy for the Congress party), and also that the two judges
have decreed only the two suits filed by the Hindu parties. The
consequence of this is immense, as will be unveiled in the next part
of this article.


The opinion about the Ayodhya judgment has been sealed by the
television discourse very much like it happens in the case of budget
papers. The discourse was less about the judgment and more about
politics like whether the court was right on deciding religious
issues such as whether it was Ram Janmasthan or there was a temple
under the mosque. The media also wailed about why the nation should
be wasting time on the temple issue when developmental issues are
crying for attention. Each of these comments is valid in itself; but
they are no substitute for a rigorous analysis of the verdict. Almost
all commentators recalled the 1992 demolition, but did not say that
Justice Agarwal (page 586) had concluded that that did not affect the
rights of the Muslims in their suit. Thus the millions who witnessed
TV channels did not get the right idea about the judgment.


And most of those who commented on the judgment were elated by how
the court had showed great "statesmanship" in giving a third of the
disputed place to Muslims. They also gloated over how that gesture
could promote secularism in India. But they did not stop a minute to
ask (unlike legal experts Rajeev Dhawan, regarded as a secular icon,
and P P Rao did) how, after saying that the Muslims and Nirmohi
Akhara had no right to sue, the two judges could give any share of
the property to them.


Political parties need votes; so they would speak only with that in
view. But should these experts and intellectuals not call a spade a
spade? Also point out what the court has actually found as facts?
They didn't. Therefore, the start of a national discourse on such a
critical legal issue, with huge political and communal implications,
could not have been shallower. For the last 20 years all political
parties and secular intellectuals had told those who were for the Ram
temple and those against to wait for the judicial verdict for
resolving the dispute.


There were four suits in all before the judges -- two by Hindu
parties; one by Muslims (Sunni Waqf Board), and the fourth, widely
believed to be the proxy of the Congress (Nirmohi Akhara). Some 121
issues were framed in the suits -- like whether the mosque was
constructed on a temple demolished or in ruins; whether the Hindus
had a long held belief that the disputed place was the birthplace of
Ram; whether the four suits were within the period of limitation set
by law; whether and how long the Hindus were worshipping at the
disputed place; whether the Muslims were also worshipping in that
place and from when to when; who owns the disputed land, the Waqf,
Nirmohi Akhara, or the deity Ram. While the Hindus' suit had claimed
the Janmasthan as exclusively that of the deity Ram, the Sunni Waqf
Board suit had claimed it as exclusively its own, the Nirmohi Akhara
suit had claimed it again as its exclusive property. In law, this
mutually exclusive claim of the three contenders meant that, if the
suit of any one was allowed that would destroy the suit of the other
two. This was how the cases, three of which were filed in 1989, the
first one by the Hindus having been filed in 1950, began -- with the
parties letting in oral and documentary evidence first and then
arguing the case later.


The principal issue in the case was: whether the disputed place
belonged to the deity Ram, or the mosque or the Nirmohi Akhara. The
critical fact to be found was whether a Hindu temple predating the
disputed mosque existed. To unravel that the Allahabad High Court had
directed the Archeological Survey of India to find out "whether there
was any temple/structure which was demolished and mosque constructed
on the disputed site" first by Ground Penetrating Radar (GRP) survey
and, thereafter, by excavation. The ASI conducted the GRP survey and
submitted a report in February 2003; after that it excavated the
disputed area and submitted a further report of 574 pages. What was
ASI's answer to the all-important question of temple under the
mosque? How have the three judges have decided the cases? What are
the legal, political implications of the decision? A clinical
dissection will reveal whether the verdict solves the dispute, or
escalates it. Await the next part.

This is the second of a three-part series on the Ayodhya judgment


The best part of the Ayodhya verdict is the judgment of Justice
Sudhir Agarwal. Though a huge affair running to over 5,200 pages, his
is one of the most organised and best-written judgments. One has only
to look at the index he has provided (at p5136-5218) in Volume 21 of
the judgment to get to what one wants -- whether it is to know what
the decision was on any of the issues, or to search for any
documentary evidence or oral testimony used or any case law
considered. Any reasonably skilled reader of legal documents may use
the index as the key to unravel the judgment in a couple of days,
which might otherwise take a fortnight.


That explains how articles like this appear in such a short time. It
must have taken Justice Agarwal long periods of stress and labour to
produce such a wonderful judicial document. More, to maintain
confidentiality he must have done lots of the work himself. Also for
writing the main judgment, he has analysed minutely all the evidence,
documentary, oral and technical, himself; so that the other judgments
just supplement his where there is agreement. But for his huge
effort, it would be extremely difficult to unravel the Ayodhya
verdict. If Justice Khan could write his "very short" judgment it is
thanks to Justice Agarwal writing a very long one.


The Ayodhya verdict is not just a legal affair. It discusses,
frankly, but with sensitivity, the Hindu-Muslim interface based on
historic facts. It also touches upon history, archeology, sociology,
religion and related disciplines. A reading of the verdict will
reveal its reach and depth. So the nation must be grateful to the
judges, particularly Justice Agarwal, for a stupendous work.


The criticality of Justice Agarwal's judgment, in the overall Ayodhya
verdict, is manifest in that, virtually what he has said has turned
out to be the final verdict. This is because, with Justice Sharma and
Justice Khan taking almost divergent positions, to the extent Justice
Agarwal agreed with either of them on any issue his views became the
final view on that issue. Just see the effect of his view on the most
sensitive issue in the Ayodhya case, namely, was a preexisting Hindu
temple destroyed to make way for the mosque?


Even though he agrees that a massive broken Hindu structure was found
under the mosque, Justice Khan does not agree that any Hindu
structure was demolished to build the disputed mosque. But Justice
Sharma is firm that a Hindu temple was indeed demolished to build the
mosque. Justice Agarwal analyses the evidence over some 900 pages
(from 3513 to 4415) and after holding that a Hindu temple predated
the mosque at the spot, he says, on evidence, that "it can safely be
said that the erstwhile structure was a Hindu temple and it was
demolished, whereafter the disputed structure was raised" (p4415).
This makes it the Court's view. But, having held that a Hindu temple
existed before the mosque was constructed, Justice Agarwal was not
keen to pursue the demolition issue. But he does. Why? Read on.


He was compelled to do so by the lies of the experts relied upon by
the Muslim parties. Prefacing that, for the purposes of the case, it
was "sufficient" to stop at finding "that the mosque had been raised"
on a pre-existing "massive temple", Justice Agarwal writes [at
p4333], "it would not have been necessary to tell positively that
there existed a massive temple structure, which was demolished and
thereafter the disputed structure was raised".


He then explains why he did that thus: the statement of so many
experts appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs (Sunni Waqf Board)
asserting that "temples in past were never demolished by then Muslim
rulers or invaders from Persia etc, is so blatant a lie" that he was
"reluctant to ignore it without referring to some well-known
historical" account of the demolition of Hindu temples, some "written
by Muslim writers themselves."


Only after that, considering (from p4333 to p4415) the massive
evidence about destroying temples, including at Ayodhya, Justice
Agarwal concluded that a Hindu temple was indeed destroyed to build
the mosque. Yet the visual media kept insisting throughout Sept 30
that the Court had indeed held that "no temple was destroyed to build
the mosque". So, till now, the people do not know the truth that
Justice Agarwal has found; they only believe as true the lie that the
media has telecast.


The critical evidence that became one of the most contentious issues
between the Hindu parties and the Muslims parties in the court was
the Archeological Survey of India (ASI) Report which established that
a massive structure "indicative of the remains which are distinctive
features" of "the temples of North India" existed under the mosque.


The first point to note was that the ASI was brought in by the court
on its own in 2002, not by any party or the government. The ASI did
the GPR survey and excavation under the orders of the court and under
supervision by two judicial officers appointed by the court, in the
presence of the counsel for the parties.


But the most disgusting part of this critical exercise, the
importance of which to the case is brilliantly captured by Justice
Agarwal (p3869-4333), was the way the Muslim parties attacked the ASI
work in court, including on the ground that the BJP was ruling then,
and that the ASI team did not include sufficient number of Muslims in
the excavation work. This led to the court chiding them for suffixing
experts with "Muslim", "Hindu" or "Christian" (Justice Agarwal p230).
But now, after the verdict, the secularists attack the court for
relying on the ASI report in almost the same language the Muslim
parties used to attack the ASI prior to the verdict!


But the otherwise well-conceived and best-written judgment badly
slipped, in law and in judicial wisdom, on the division of the
disputed site.


That, in the final part tomorrow.

The otherwise legally proper and judiciously sound Ayodhya verdict has suffered serious legal haemorrhage by the decision of Justice Khan and Justice Agarwal to divide the disputed land into three parts and give one-third each to Hindus, Muslims and the Nirmohi Akhara. This article explains that fatal infirmity. An issue where law is mixed with facts, it calls for some strenuous reading to know what the deadly defect in the judgment is. To recall, the short facts are: in their two suits, the Hindus claim the disputed site as exclusively their own; in their suit, the Muslims claim it exclusively as their own; in its suit, the Nirmohi Akhara too claims it as exclusively its own. None of them had asked for nor would accept to share the disputed land with any other or the others.


To simplify the law for the uninitiated, the law says that a person filing a suit has to plead his case properly and clearly, and also ask for reliefs in clear terms. The court will look only what suitor says in his plaint and his opponents in response, nothing else, to know what is the case. It will then frame the contentious issues and decide them on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and evidence tendered by them. The principal issues decided on that basis by the Allahabad High Court, unanimously or by 2:1 majority, in the present case are: one, the rights of the Hindus over the Ram Janmabhoomi never ceased at any point in time; two, the Muslims were never in possession of the disputed premises at any point in time; three, the Muslims failed to prove their possession of any part of the disputed land; four, the last time the Muslims did namaz on the disputed property was on 16.12.1949; five, the Hindus never admitted possession by Muslims at any time, even in the suit of 1885; six, Muslims never acquired title even by adverse possession; seven, the Akhara never had possession nor acquired title by adverse possession; eight, the suits of Muslims and the Akhara, having been filed beyond the limitation period, are dismissed. On this basis, the court dismissed the suits of Muslims and Akhara, thus denying any relief. While, Justice Sharma allowed the suits of Hindus in full, Justice Agarwal and Justice Khan allowed the Hindus’ suit partly.

On why they ruled partitioning of the disputed land, Justice Agarwal and Justice Khan have said that under a provision (Order 7 Rule 7) in the Civil Procedure Code they had the authority to give less relief than what the Hindus had prayed for in their suits. So by assuming that they had the power to reduce the share of the Hindus, the two judges seem to have thought that they had also the power to give the balance to Muslims (1/3) and the Akhara (1/3); in the process what the two judges have done is to give Muslims and Akhara rights, which Justice Sharma and Justice Agarwal have separately declared they do not have. Also none of the three parties had asked for what the court has done. The first principle is that, any relief beyond what the suits set out in pleadings and prayers can only be given at the instance of one of the parties; not by the court on its own motion like it has done in this case. If parties themselves had not asked for anything outside the pleadings, the court cannot go beyond their pleadings at all.

The law on this point has never been in doubt. The Madras High Court has ruled in 1998 (Arunachalm Pillai Vs Ramu Mudaliar and others) that where each party claims exclusive title to the property and none of them accept the right of the other (exactly as in the Ayodhya case) the question of partitioning the property between them does not arise at all (under the very provision of law cited by the two judges in Ayodhya case). The courts in Patna, Kolkata, and the Madras High Court itself have ruled this principle earlier. As far back as 1991 the Supreme Court (Om Prakash V Ram Kumar (1991) 1 SCC 441) had ruled that even if a party asks for reliefs outside his pleadings the court can never allow them; by doing so it will prejudice rights of the other party.

So the settled legal position is this: even if parties, like the Ayodhya parties, who have filed suit asserting exclusive rights against one another, ask for partition, the court cannot grant it; and in no event the court can do it without the parties asking for it. None of these judicial rulings seem to have been noticed by the two judges. Had one of the parties asked for partition, the other party would have brought the case laws to the court’s notice. That is why law requires that the court should decide no issue that is not put to the parties. An order contrary to this principle is, in law, without jurisdiction. Civil law pundits would cite the old maxim of Coram Non Judici to say that the courts — read Justice Khan and Justice Agarwal — have no jurisdiction to do what they have done.

Now that they have passed the judgment, the judges will have to write a decree in accordance with the judgment. Assume that the judges can write a decree in the Hindus’ suit giving them less than their claim of 1/3 share. The suits of Muslims and Akhara having been dismissed, how could a decree be written in their favour? If no decree could be passed in their favour in their suits, they cannot get the 1/3 share at all. And no decree could be passed in the suits of the Hindus in favour of Muslims and Akhara! Therefore, the 1/3 gift by the two judges to them each will be only on paper. So a new battle will start only at the point if the two judges attempt to write the decree for two-thirds of the disputed land in favour of the Muslims and the Akhara whose suits stand dismissed.

The legal unsoundness aside, the decision to divide the disputed land and award 1/3 each to the Muslims and the Akhara, stands out contrary to the spirit of the otherwise judicious judgment. It has put roadblock on the temple construction; how could a temple to which a million people come on Ram Navami day be accommodated in one acre of land (a third of the disputed area) with a mosque beside. It will be an invitation to a law and order disaster.

Many idealists welcome this action of the two judges as an ideal solution. But, in sensitive issues like relations between Hindus and Muslims (many among whom still share bitter memories of past) the ideal is not practical; only what is practical is ideal. This sense of idealism without practical sense is that what seems to have led the two judges into the judicially erroneous decision to divide the disputed land.

QED: The historic Ayodhya judgment has, thanks to this fatal defect, now less potential to resolve the dispute and more potential to escalate it.

(This is the final of a three-part series on the Ayodhya judgment)

Forgetting facts

T. K. RAJALAKSHMI
The judgment apparently has not taken into account the evidence presented by leading historians on the disputed site.
THE “compromise” judgment of the Allahabad High Court, for all its merits and attempts to achieve communal amity, is perceived as a setback for the basic tenets of historical inquiry and precision. Social scientists of all hues have reacted with dismay to the dominance of faith and belief over scientific fact and historicity.
While a section of the political class and the intelligentsia genuinely believes that it is time to move on and let the higher judiciary take up the matter if need be, historians and students of history wonder what happened to all the evidence painstakingly collected in the national interest by leading historians and archaeologists of the country. One of them, the archaeologist Suraj Bhan, who is no more, had noted the strain the dispute had created, before the demolition, and attempted, purely voluntarily, to set the record straight, not only to maintain communal amity but to protect academic integrity.
In 1991, two significant reports, one in March and the other in May, were written with the sole objective of presenting to the nation information relating to the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid issue. The May report, titled “Ramjanambhoomi-Babri Masjid issue: A preliminary study of the archaeological evidence”, was by Suraj Bhan, who was Professor of Archaeology in the Department of Ancient Indian History, Culture and Archaeology at Kurukshetra University in Haryana. This was an interim report, which was submitted to the Indian Council of Historical Research (ICHR). The Home Ministry had assigned it the task of authenticating the documents submitted by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the All India Babri Masjid Action Committee (AIBMAC).
Suraj Bhan made these observations on the basis of the excavations done by Professor B.B. Lal during 1975-80, his own study of the archaeological remains at Ayodhya, and evidence collected in 1969-70:
“There is nothing wrong in looking for a kernel of truth in the literary tradition of the Ramayana. But what is necessary for a scientific methodology is to build a reasonable hypothesis about the structured entity which must have been objectively in existence in the past. The metaphor of kernel would not encourage the scientist to critically examine either the evidence buried in the texts or the material evidence collected through excavations in order to identify the structure of relationship embodied in the evidence. Merely locating the names of personages and places in the time frame does not suffice for this purpose. It will only confirm the vague understanding of history we have unconsciously imbibed through what is called common sense.... What has limited the significance of B.B. Lal's attempt is the vague notion of history that is implicit in his approach.... On account of the limitations of Professor B.B. Lal's approach mentioned above, we cannot accept his view that archaeological evidence proved the historicity of Ram as a personage who lived at the site where the present day Ayodhya is located during the period of early NBP [northern black polished] ware (circa 700 B.C.) or that he was born at the place where Babri Masjid today stands.”
The second report, titled “Ramjanmabhumi Baburi Masjid - A Historians' Report to the Nation”, was authored by historians R.S. Sharma, M. Athar Ali, D.N. Jha and Suraj Bhan. R.S. Sharma and D.N. Jha were professors of History at the University of Delhi (Sharma was also the first Chairman of the ICHR) and Athar Ali was Professor of History at Aligarh Muslim University. That the dispute whether a Ram temple existed at the site of the Babri Masjid was being left entirely to the litigants and had not involved historians of any standing worried the four historians. They approached the government to consider the views of independent historians and also requested that archaeological and textual evidence in possession with government organisations such as the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) be made available to them.
While the AIBMAC agreed to abide by the findings of an independent group of historians, the VHP did not accept it. The government maintained a tactical silence all along. Undeterred, the four historians embarked on the project on their own in the national interest as they felt that people had a right to know the historical facts.
The very first thing they noted was that the VHP had been unable to cite any ancient Sanskrit text in support of its claim that there was an ancient Hindu belief that a particular spot in Ayodhya was the Ram Janmasthan (birthplace of Ram). The report concluded, after looking at various pieces of textual and archaeological evidence, including Tulsidas' Ramcharitamanas, that no evidence existed in the texts of any veneration being attached to any spot in Ayodhya before the 16th century (and indeed before the 18th century) for being the birthplace of Ram and that there were no grounds for supposing that a Ram temple or any temple existed at the site where the Babri Masjid was built in 1528-29.
Their conclusion rested on an examination of the archaeological evidence as well as the contemporary inscriptions on the mosque. They concluded that the legend that the Babri Masjid occupied the site of Ram's birth did not arise until the 18th century and that a temple was destroyed to build the mosque was not asserted until the beginning of the 19th century. They held that the full-blown legend of the destruction of a temple that stood at the site of Ram's birth and at Sita ki Rasoi came as late as the 1850s. “Since then, what we get is merely the progressive reconstruction of ‘imagined history' based on faith,” noted the four historians in their report to the nation.
After examining the inconsistencies in the VHP claim based on the Ayodhya Mahatmya (the merits of visiting Ayodhya) given in the Skanda Purana, the core of which was not compiled earlier than the 16th century, the historians noted: “In spite of these various inconsistencies, even if we accept the location of the birthplace of Rama as given in the Ayodhya Mahatmya, it does not tally with the site of the Babri Masjid... according to Hindu belief as given in the Ayodhya Mahatmya of the Skanda Purana, the birthplace of Rama cannot be located on the site where the Babri Masjid stands. It is argued by the experts of the VHP that the location of the Ram Janmabhumi is given on the basis of solar directions and cannot be determined through the use of the compass. But even if we take solar directions into account, the Janmabhumi of the Skanda Purana cannot be located on the site of the Babri Masjid. The various versions of Ayodhya Mahatmya seem to have been prepared towards the end of the 18th century or in the beginning of the 19th; even as late as that the birthplace was not considered to be important. It is significant that the Janmasthan is not mentioned even once in any itinerary of pilgrimage given in the Mahatmya.”
The historians also relied on the most primary source of recorded historical evidence, the Persian inscriptions on the mosque. Presenting a full translation of the inscriptions, the historians observed that the contemporaneity of the inscriptions was shown by their text and date, and their accuracy was established by the fact that Mir Baqi finds mention in Babur's memoirs as the governor of Awadh or Ayodhya at exactly the same time.
The report noted: “These fairly long inscriptions show that the construction of the Babri Masjid was completed in 1528-29. But nowhere is any hint given in them that the edifice was built after destroying a temple or upon the site of a temple. If one accepts for the purpose of argument that there was a temple at the site, and the builder of the mosque (Mir Baqi) destroyed it to build a mosque, one has to answer why at all should all reference to this fact be omitted in the foundation inscriptions. Surely, had Mir Baqi destroyed a temple, he would have deemed it a meritorious deed; and what would have been more natural than that he should get this act recorded along with that of the building of the mosque to add to his religious reputation. That he did not get any such act recorded surely means that he had in fact not destroyed any temple, and so found no reason to record something that had not happened.”
Expressing surprise at Tulsidas' Ramcharitamanas also not mentioning the desecration of a temple at the site of the mosque, the historians wrote: “Within fifty years or so of the construction of the Babri Masjid, Tulsidas composed in 1575-76 his celebrated Ramcharitamanas, the most fervent exposition of the Ramayana story in Avadhi. Is it possible to believe that Tulsidas would not have given vent to heart-rending grief had the very birth site of his Lord been ravaged, its temple razed to the ground and a mosque erected at that place? His silence can only mean that he knew of no such scandal; and given his attachment to Rama and Ayodhya, this must mean that no such event had in fact taken place. Tulsidas, on the contrary, suggests that it was not Ayodhya but Prayag that was to him the principal place of pilgrimage ( tirath raj); and so no tradition of the veneration of any spot as that of Rama's birth at Ayodhya had yet taken shape.”
The historians added that even Abul Fazl, in his A'in-i-Akbari, completed in 1598, wrote about Ayodhya being the “residence of Ramachandra, who in the Treta age combined in his own person both the spiritual supremacy and the kingly office” but did not confine Ram's place of birth to the existing town of Ayodhya, let alone the site occupied by the Babri Masjid. “Had such tradition existed, Abul Fazl would surely have mentioned it, because he does mention the tradition that two Jewish prophets lie buried at Ayodhya,” they noted in their report.
As for the black pillar bases that were used to vouch for the existence of a temple, the historians noted, after examining many records, including those of art historians, that there was nothing to show that “the pillar bases were remains of a local temple of which they formed an integral part in the beginning and the mosque was erected over them”.
In his own report to the ICHR, Suraj Bhan wrote of the pillars: “This is a wild hypothesis not backed by any material evidence and is actually negated by the factual position easily verifiable from the existing structure of the Babri Masjid. The stone pillars are, in fact, embedded at the arched entrances in the massive walls of the mosque and stand at the floor level on the foundation walls constructed for the big building. Only those who have failed to understand the architectural plan of the building and wilfully ignore the indisputable factual position will insist on seeing these stone pillars as in situ. Since black stone pillars are relatively short and slender, they cannot be load bearing. In fact, their placement at the arched entrances and the colour contrast they offer as also the carvings on them suggest that they have been used only as decorative pieces and are not architecturally functional beyond this decorative purpose. Furthermore, the placement of the pillars fits in the plan of the mosque and not that of a Hindu temple.”
The September 30 judgment has evinced strong reactions from a cross-section of historians and archaeologists. On behalf of the Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust, 62 academics, including Romila Thapar, Irfan Habib, D.N. Jha, K.M. Shrimali, K.N. Panikkar, Utsa Patnaik, Shireen Moosvi, Amiya Kumar Bagchi, Suvira Jaiswal and Arjun Dev, have demanded that the notebooks, artefacts and other material evidence relating to the ASI's excavation at the site be made available for scrutiny by scholars, historians and archaeologists.
First of all, the view that the Babri Masjid was built on the site of a Hindu temple – which has been maintained by two of the three judges who gave the verdict – does not take into account all the evidence turned up by the ASI's own excavations. The presence of animal bones throughout and the use of “surkhi” (made from powdered burnt bricks) and lime mortar (all characteristics of Muslim presence) rule out the possibility of a Hindu temple having been there beneath the mosque. The judgment, the academics said, had raised serious concerns about the way history, reason and secular values, which much of rational India shared, had been treated.

‘A dangerous precedent'

T. K. RAJALAKSHMI
Interview with Prakash Karat, general secretary, CPI(M).

Prakash Karat: “Judicial verdict has to be grounded in constitutional principles.”
THE Communist Party of India (Marxist) has been one of the most vocal critics of the demolition of the Babri Masjid. Like many other secular political parties, the CPI(M) has expressed surprise and dismay at the importance given by the Allahabad High Court to issues such as faith and belief in its verdict. In an interview given to Frontline, CPI(M) general secretary Prakash Karat opined that any judicial verdict had to be firmly grounded in secular, democratic and constitutional principles. Excerpts:
What are your impressions of the judgment? Do you think there is something disquieting about it?
Since the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992, the scope for a negotiated settlement has not existed. We have been maintaining that the problem can be resolved only through the judicial process and a judicial verdict. How we settle the Ayodhya dispute will be a test case for the democratic and secular basis of the Indian state. That is why we had rejected those claims from the Hindutva outfits that the building of a Ram temple is a matter of faith and cannot be decided by the courts. Now that the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court has given its judgment, we have to see if this judgment is going to settle the issue in a manner where justice has been done and the secular and democratic principles and methods of resolving such issues have been adhered to.
There is a general impression that the majority decision of the Lucknow Bench to divide up the 2.77 acres of land whereby two-thirds of the land goes to the Hindu petitioners and one-third to the Muslim side is a compromise solution and a step towards a settlement.
At the same time, a disturbing feature of the set of judgments is the primacy accorded to “faith and belief”; originally what was being heard by the Lucknow Bench were the title deed suits, which required going by the facts and the evidence.
A judgment on the dispute on where a mosque existed for four and a half centuries, and which was demolished in December 1992, is now being resolved on the basis of the faith and belief of a particular community. This is something that will create a dangerous precedent.
What kind of a precedent do you think this judgment can set, given the primacy it has accorded to issues of faith and belief?
It can open up many more such claims and disputes in the future citing the religious faith of some people. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad still demands the handing over of sites in Mathura and Kashi for religious purposes. The three-judge Bench has unnecessarily framed issues which go beyond the jurisdiction of title deed suits. The Supreme Court had rejected a reference made by the President of India, which was at the behest of the [P.V.] Narasimha Rao government in 1993, where one of the issues posed before the court was whether a temple existed or not at the site before the mosque was built. The Supreme Court correctly refused to entertain such a reference. The Supreme Court then had revived the title deed suit before the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court.
What impact do you think this judgment will have on the ongoing cases involving the demolition of the Babri Masjid?
Already the ongoing cases regarding the demolition of the Babri Masjid have been diluted. The charge sheets framed originally have been watered down. Still, the criminal offence of the demolition has to be decided by the law; the basis on which the judgment has been given by the Lucknow Bench does not augur well for the judicial proceedings on the demolition cases.
There is already jubilation in certain quarters, cynicism among others, and the ruling political class opines that moving forward is the best solution.
Given the verdict of the Lucknow Bench, the matter will go to the Supreme Court for a final decision. No party to the dispute or any section of people can demand any step to be taken until the Supreme Court gives the final judgment. The people by and large, irrespective of which community they belong to, want the matter settled through the rule of law. The demands made by the extremist fringe groups do not reflect the opinion of the general public.
What do you finally think will be the outcome of the judicial process?
I think the Supreme Court will have to undo the premise on which a verdict has been given citing religious faith as the criterion for settling the question of ownership and recorded history of the dispute.

‘We can offer Muslims land anywhere else'

PURNIMA S. TRIPATHI
Interview with Acharya Giriraj Kishore and Pravin Togadia.
IN the light of the verdict of the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the Ayodhya title suit, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) has demanded that the Central government hand over to it the entire 67 acres of acquired area so that a Ram temple can be built. Acharya Giriraj Kishore and Pravin Togadia, senior international vice-president and international general secretary respectively of the organisation, spoke to Frontline on the verdict. Excerpts from the interview:
Now that the High Court has ruled that the place where the Ram Lalla idol is kept is the birthplace of Ram, do you feel vindicated?
Togadia: The Allahabad High Court verdict is an affirmation of the faith of crores of Hindus the world over. The fact that all three judges unanimously decided on the issue of the birthplace of Lord Ram being at the spot where the idol is being worshipped by Hindus for years is an acknowledgement of the belief of Hindus and we welcome it and accept the verdict. Our stand has been vindicated that this is the birthplace of Lord Ram. This is further corroborated by the fact that the Sunni Central Waqf Board's claim over the title deed has been dismissed unanimously by the court.
But the court has also ordered that one-third of the disputed land be handed over to the waqf board.
Togadia: The Sunni Central Waqf Board's title claim has been rejected by the court, and since the court has ruled that the place where the idol is kept at present is the birthplace of Lord Ram, what meaning does the waqf board claims have? We want to build a grand Ram temple at the spot and demand that the Central government hand over the entire 67 acres of land to us for this purpose. We appeal to all, including the Muslim community, to come forward and help in building a grand Ram temple at the spot, in keeping with the spirit of the court ruling. Besides, the waqf board has also claimed that if it is proved this is the birthplace of Lord Ram it will give up its claim over the land. It should follow what it has said all along.
Acharya Giriraj Kishore: I appeal to the Muslim community to forget the past and work for the construction of a Ram temple in Ayodhya. This is a rare opportunity for them to pave the way for everlasting peace and amity between the two communities and they should avail themselves of this opportunity. Once they do this and give up their claim over the Kashi and Mathura temples, there would be everlasting peace and communal harmony.
But the court has found their claim valid for one-third part of the land.
Togadia: See, their title suit claim has been dismissed by the court, so they should be magnanimous enough to give up their claim over this land now and join hands with us in building a temple. This will be in the larger interest of all. We have made it clear in our resolutions before that we will not allow any mosque in or around the disputed area. We can offer Muslims land anywhere else but Ayodhya, and if they agree to our proposal we will help in making a grand mosque for them. Ayodhya is one of the most sacred places for millions of Hindus and they should respect this.
What if the Supreme Court upholds the High Court decision?
Togadia: We will see then. As of today, our position is clear. Besides, Muslims should understand that they have lost the title case on the issue of law; their claim has been rejected as it was found to be time barred. We are confident the Supreme Court will see the merit in this.
It took the court 60 years to come to this conclusion. A lot of violence and bloodshed could have been avoided had the case been decided earlier.
Acharya Giriraj Kishore: This was a very sensitive case and the court had to take cognisance of many aspects – thousands of witnesses to be heard, thousands of pieces of evidence to be examined. We are satisfied that finally justice has prevailed. It is a historic event that has the potential to change forever the political landscape of India. Once Muslims understand and accept the spirit of this verdict, Hindu-Muslim relations will change forever. Let bygones be bygones, let there be no acrimony and let there be peace for all time to come.
How do you intend to take your temple construction plan forward?
Togadia: That is for the sadhus and the sants to decide. This time they will lead the temple construction programme. We have no plans for the immediate future.